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This paper presents new evidence on income inequality in Latin America over the period 
1981-2000. Using a panel data methodology, we find that a reduction in corruption is 
associated with a rise in inequality. This counterintuitive result can be explained by 
privatisation. Privatisation removes industries from government influence (and corruption) 
and worsens income inequality as new owners strive for efficiency and profits. The paper 
argues that structural reform policies aimed primarily at achieving positive and increasing 
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  1Corruption, privatisation and the distribution of income in Latin America  
1. Introduction 
Surveys of public opinion in Latin America highlight corruption and inequality as 
major problems facing the region, along with unemployment and crime (Lagos, 2003). 
Though corruption is perceived to be a problem throughout the region, the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
1 reports that during the period 1980-2000, several countries, 
including Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala and El Salvador, showed evidence of declining 
corruption. In 2001, 90 per cent of the population considered the distribution of income in the 
region to be unfair or very unfair (see Lopez and Perry, 2008).  
The origins of corruption and income inequality in Latin America go back to the early 
post colonial period and the development of key institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; 
Acemoglu et al, 2002). At this time, a privileged few controlled the profitable activities and to 
protect their interests, institutions were structured in such a way that most of the population 
were denied access to land, education and political power. The pattern of non-representative 
and exclusionary institutions survived the move to independence across the region as the 
Creole elite gained control of key institutions and shaped them to their advantage. This elite 
group was able to wield significant influence on the formation and implementation of 
government policies. For example, the failure to expand public education helped to protect the 
vested interests of the elite group.
2 This neglect continued into the 20
th century with education 
being of low quality
3 and patterns of social exclusion and discrimination persisting (Lopez 
and Perry, 2008). 
The opening up of the international economy exacerbated rather than reduced income 
disparities because the gains accrued to landholders (the elite). These gains were exaggerated 
by the fact that Latin America is rich in natural resources, the abundant productive factor in 
the region. Natural resources (rather than labour
4) were more intensively used in the 
  2production of exportable goods. Consequently, returns to land grew relative to those of 
labour. Since the majority of the population were excluded from owning property, the income 
distribution problem worsened as the wealth of landowners increased. The natural outcome 
was that inequality increased over the early period of globalisation (Williamson, 1999)
5. 
While the above sheds light on the roots of inequality in Latin America, it also 
illustrates the close link between corrupt practices, institutions and inequality. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that if there had been less preferential treatment towards the few in the 
early colonial period, the outcome with respect to inequality may well have been different. 
The discussion also highlights the fact that corruption is entrenched in the political and 
economic operations of the region.  
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) suggest that the distribution of income did not 
change from the time of independence to the mid 20
th century, while Morley (2000) argues 
that since World War 2 the situation has worsened. Londono and Szekeley (2000) argue that 
inequality levels in the 1990s were similar to those in the 1930s. De Ferranti et al (2004) note 
that, as in the 19
th century, authoritarianism, may be the primary reason for the persistence of 
inequality in the 20
th century. Although democratisation has taken place, the process is 
unconsolidated and the authors conclude that correcting institutional failures along with direct 
polices are essential to reduce inequality. Perry et al (2006) confirm the findings of De 
Ferranti et al and after examining the evidence conclude that Latin America entered the 20
th 
century with high levels of inequality which persisted for the rest of the century. This 
conclusion is highlighted in a study of Argentina; Calvo et al (2002) indicate that inequality 
levels changed little during the 20
th century. 
According to economic theory, corruption is expected to worsen income inequality 
(Mauro, 1997; Jain, 2001; Gupta et al, 2002). Corruption, in the form of tax evasions and 
exemptions, reduces tax revenues and funds for social programmes, including education and 
  3health. Furthermore, since the beneficiaries of tax evasion and exemptions are more likely to 
be the relatively wealthy, the tax burden falls almost exclusively on the poor, making the 
effective tax system regressive. The impact on social programmes can be more direct as funds 
may be siphoned out of poverty alleviation programmes in order to extend benefits to 
relatively wealthy population groups. Even when social programmes are not reduced, 
corruption may change the composition of social spending in a manner that benefits the rich 
at the expense of the poor; for example, expenditure on tertiary rather primary education. In a 
corrupt system, the allocation of public procurement contracts may lead to inferior public 
infrastructure, which also has implications for inequality and welfare. In sum, corruption in a 
government allows for polices which favour the higher income groups and hence promotes 
greater inequality. 
The empirical literature on corruption and income inequality finds that higher levels of 
corruption increase income inequality. In a few studies a number of Latin American countries 
have been included as part of a larger sample of both developing and developed countries 
(e.g. Li et al, 2000; Gupta et al, 2002; Gyimah-Brempong and Muñoz de Camacho, 2006). 
However, no study has yet examined inequality and corruption across Latin America. The 
region has seen financial crises, periods of positive and negative growth, huge external 
borrowing, closed market policies and pro-market reforms, yet high inequality persists and 
our understanding of income inequality remains limited. In this study, we present new 
evidence on income inequality in Latin America, focusing in particular on the relationship 
between inequality and corruption. In contrast to other work and a priori expectation, we find 
that lower levels of corruption are associated with higher levels of inequality. This surprising 
finding is explained by the privatisation process in the region (see Section 3).  
  4The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the model specification and data 
are described. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
reports some robustness tests and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model Specification and Data 
Econometric estimation is conducted using four-year panel data over the period 1981-
2000 for 19 Latin American countries,
6 with each observation of the dependent variable being 
the relevant four year average value. Panel data provides more degrees of freedom than cross-
section and time series data. Furthermore, panel data analysis controls for omitted variable 
bias, thus improving the accuracy of parameter estimates. This approach also has the 
advantage of capturing possible idiosyncratic differences in income inequality by means of 
the time invariant individual effects. A priori, a fixed effects model is preferred to a random 
effects model since we expect the explanatory variables to be correlated with the unobserved 
individual effects. All the countries of the region for which data is available are included in 
the study. There are some missing observations in the data so the panel is unbalanced.  
The empirical specification is similar to that in previous empirical research (see Li et 
al, 1998; Barro, 2000; Lundberg and Squire, 2003): 
=+ + it it i it IX A β ε      = = (i 1,....n;t 1,......T )   (1) 
where I is a measure of income inequality for country i at time t. Xit is a vector of explanatory 
variables which vary across time and countries. It includes a corruption variable (corupt) 
among other explanatory variables.  The parameter A i contains a constant and individual-
specific variables that are invariant over time (for example, geographical factors), and εit is the 
classical error term.   
The dependent variable is a standard measure of income inequality, the Gini 
coefficient. The data on inequality is drawn from the United Nations World Income Inequality 
  5Database (WIID) (UNU-WIDER, 2005).
7 We use the new quality label provided in Version 
2a of the WIID, which combines and improves the quality ratings in Deininger and Squire 
(1996) with older versions of the WIID. Data classified as the lowest quality is excluded. 
Furthermore, only data which covers the entire population is employed. Gini coefficients are 
based on income rather than on consumption because of data limitations. For each country, 
we have formed the longest possible series of observations.  
The measure of corruption adopted is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
corruption index which is collected and published annually by Political Risk Services (PRS). 
This measure focuses on corruption in government and has been used in the development 
economics literature (e.g. Fisman and Gatti, 2002). The corruption variable is intended to 
capture the likelihood that high level government officials will demand special payments, and 
the extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout lower levels of government 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995). Compared to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), this measure 
has the advantage of having the broadest coverage for Latin American countries for the study 
period and it is appropriate here because we are interested in examining the role of corruption 
in government. The ICRG measure takes values from zero (most corrupt) to six (least 
corrupt), so a priori, a rise in the corruption index (less corruption) is expected to lead to a fall 
in the Gini coefficient (a negative sign on the variable corupt). The privatisation variable 
(priv) is taken from Lora (2001) and is defined as cumulative privatisation as a percentage of 
GDP. 
The natural logarithm of real output per capita (lgdp) and real output per capita 
squared (lgdp
2) are included to test the classical Kuznets hypothesis (Kuznets, 1955; Lewis, 
1954). According to this hypothesis, inequality rises with income at low levels but falls once 
income reaches a critical level. In line with other studies (e.g. Bourguignon and Morrison, 
1998; Li et al, 1998; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000; Morley, 2000; Reuveny and Li, 2003; 
  6Breen and García-Peñalosa, 2005), the model also includes the following variables: primary 
(primary) and secondary (secondary) gross school enrolment rates, the share of agriculture in 
total output (aggdp), the ratio of broad money to output (m2gdp) and a variable to represent 
the distribution of land resources (land). Both land and education represent investment in 
assets (physical and human) and should contribute to lowering inequality. Because of its 
labour intensive nature, an expansion of the agriculture sector is expected to increase 
employment levels and contribute to reducing inequality. Finally, m2gdp is included as an 
indicator of financial development. Greater financial development is expected to lower 
inequality by alleviating credit constraints and by making investment opportunities more 
available to low income households. Data for all these variables is taken from the Penn World 
Table, Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002), World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (2003) and Frankema (2005). 
An important potential issue in estimating equation (1) is the endogeneity of the 
control variables. Incorporating time invariant fixed effects into the model addresses this issue 
to some extent, but the inclusion of time varying factors means omitted variable bias is still a 
potential problem. Furthermore, if there is correlation between at least one explanatory 
variable and the error term, OLS estimates will suffer from simultaneity bias.
8 In order to deal 
with both potential problems, an instrumental variable (IV) methodology is adopted. It should 
be noted, however, that because of data limitations we only instrument for the corruption 
variable.  
A valid instrument for the corruption variable must be correlated with it and be 
uncorrelated with the error term. Three instruments are used – democracy, ethnicity
9 and the 
quality of bureaucracy. The first two of these have been discussed elsewhere as instruments 
for corruption (see Gupta et al, 2002; Treisman, 2000). Bureaucracy measures the degree to 
which there is an established mechanism for recruitment and training, autonomy from 
  7political pressure, and strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services when governments change. Given this definition, it is 
likely that countries with higher a level of bureaucracy are more vulnerable to corrupt 
practises since the government plays a larger role in the decision making processes of non-
governmental organisations. The bureaucracy index
10 can be interpreted as an indicator of the 
independence of appointments of key personnel in non-governmental organisations, for 
example, the central bank, judiciary and media houses. It seems likely that interference in 
such appointments by government can facilitate corruption as there are fewer avenues for 
checks and balances. It also seems likely that such appointments have little direct impact on 
inequality except via income, which is already included in the model. The relationship 
between the corruption index and the bureaucracy index is shown in Figure 1.  
A potential issue in using bureaucracy as an instrument is that it may be correlated 
with the error term. The main source for such correlation comes via the region’s historical 
legacies and in particular, its socio-political culture. However, since these factors will already 
have been captured to a large extent by the fixed effects, we can be confident that bureaucracy 
is an appropriate instrument for corruption. 
Table 1 shows the four-year average values for the Gini coefficient. Inequality 
increased steadily over the period for the region as a whole. There is evidence of variation 
across individual countries and variation over different time periods. For example, while 
countries like Panama and Paraguay saw marked increases in the Gini index over the period, 
others like Costa Rica and Uruguay saw much more modest increases. No country 
experienced a large reduction in inequality over the period as a whole. Table 2 presents four 
year averages for the corruption index. The average value of the index for Latin America as a 
whole has increased over the study period (corruption levels have fallen), though there is 
some variation to this pattern across countries. Figure 2 describes the relationship between the 
  8Gini index and the corruption index. As expected, a rise in the corruption index is associated 
with a lower level of inequality, ceteris paribus.  
 
3. Empirical results and analysis 
The results of estimating (1) are shown in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) show the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) results and columns (3) and (4) show the results of the 
instrumental variable (IV) analysis (which corrects for the possible endogeneity of the 
corruption variable). For the OLS estimates, a Hausman test rejects the random effects model 
in favour of the fixed effects model. Along with the fixed effects, the explanatory variables 
capture at least 85 per cent of the variation in income inequality across countries. Table 3 also 
reports statistical information on the validity of the instruments. The F-1st statistic reports the 
F test statistic from the first stage regression and captures the relevance of the instruments. 
The high F-test statistic indicates that the instruments are not weak in the sense discussed in 
the econometric literature on instrumental variables methods (Bound et al, 1995; Staiger and 
Stock, 1997). Thus, the standard methods for statistical inference using the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors are reliable. Furthermore, based on the test for overidentifying 
restrictions, the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous cannot be rejected. We 
therefore conclude that the IV regression is based on valid instruments.  
The sign on the coefficient corupt in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 is positive and 
under IV estimation the coefficient doubles in size. This result is particularly interesting as it 
indicates that a rise in the corruption index is associated with a rise in the Gini coefficient, and 
so contradicts our a priori expectation that lower corruption leads to a fall in inequality. The 
finding that inequality increases with falling levels of corruption is in contrast to other studies 
(e.g., Hindriks et al, 1998; Johnston, 1989; Gupta et al, 2002; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002).  
  9Why is less corruption associated with higher levels of inequality in Latin America? 
To appreciate this finding, one has to consider the role of government policy in the economic 
development of the region. The experiences of the 1930s and World War 2 pushed Latin 
American countries towards a policy of self reliance based on import substitution. Import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI) was an economy-wide-strategy with government playing an 
active and visible role.  
The main instruments of ISI were quotas, import licences, tariffs, an overvalued 
exchange rate, foreign currency rationing, subsidies for inputs and transportation, tax breaks, 
and preferential interest rates. These instruments helped to create an environment suitable for 
corrupt activities. For example, restrictions on imports make import licenses very valuable 
since importers are willing to bribe officials in order to obtain them.
11 The availability of 
credit at preferential rates and foreign exchange allocation schemes also create incentives for 
rent seeking. Managers of state owned banks allocate credit and foreign exchange based on 
personal preferences and businessmen are willing to bribe managers in order to obtain the 
necessary credit and foreign exchange (Cardoso and Helwege, 1995). The provision of tax 
breaks and other benefits by the government have a similar impact. In sum, ISI promotes the 
growth of the government sector relative to the private sector and creates an environment 
which is conducive to corruption.  
By the 1970s it was clear that inward looking policies were not sustainable and a 
reliance on the state had not produced the expected results. However, the availability of 
external borrowing allowed many Latin American countries to continue with this 
development strategy. Rising interest rates in the early 1980s prompted a rethink and a new 
development strategy emerged. The market based approach to development resulted in the 
removal of preferential treatment by the state which had existed under ISI. The natural 
implication is that the potential for earning rents and, by extension, the need to bribe 
  10government officials becomes a non-issue. Moreover, the liberalisation of the exchange rate 
and the privatisation of the financial sectors also reduced the potential to earn rents. In short, 
the implementation of an economic policy based on liberalisation and a reduced role for the 
state created less room for rent-seeking activities and, to this extent, reduced activities that are 
associated with a high degree of government intervention in the production process. This view 
is shared by Rose-Ackerman (1999) who notes that the most obvious way to reduce rent-
earning activities is to eliminate corrupt programmes. 
Privatisation was/is a key element in the reform strategy in Latin America. Since 
nationalised firms were generally inefficient, privatisation involved the restructuring of 
industries in an attempt to improve efficiency and profitability (there are a few examples 
where industries were restructured before privatisation). This usually included laying-off 
workers as many companies had a bloated labour at the time of privatisation. Unless these 
workers were absorbed by other industries or given some form of severance payment which 
lasted until alternative employment was obtained, income inequality increased. Hence, to the 
extent that corruption coexists with state-owned enterprises and a high degree of protection, 
privatisation, and the opening up of markets, brings an end to such practices. However, the 
need for efficiency in newly privatised industries means a loss of jobs.  
While privatisation removes industries from direct government influence and hence 
government corruption, it worsens income inequality through several channels. First of all, 
the increase in unemployment which follows privatisation hurts the lower class directly.
12 For 
example, LaPorta and Silanes (1999) examined pre and post privatisation performance of 218 
Mexican firms which were privatised between 1983 and 1993. They find a labour 
retrenchment figure of 33 per cent. Several other studies in Latin America have found similar 
results (e.g., Galiani et al 2005; Capra et al 2005; Pombo and Ramirez, 2005). According to a 
review by Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2005), privatised firms reduced a substantial 
  11percentage of their workforce in all countries of the region, Chile being the exception. 
Furthermore, as privatisation often results in increased prices for previously public goods, the 
lower classes are the most affected as they are the principal beneficiaries of these goods. 
Beyond its effect on prices, consumer welfare may be adversely affected through decreased 
access and a lower quality of goods and services. Privatisation may also result in the 
elimination of subsides to public services which are sometimes genuinely redistributive 
(Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2003; Bayliss, 2002; Birdsall and Nellis, 2003).  
The relationship between privatisation and corruption is shown informally in Figures 3 
and 4. Data on privatisation is taken from the World Bank’s Bureaucrats in Business (1995) 
and the variable is defined as the share of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in economic 
activity. As privatisation increases the share of SOEs in economic activity falls. This data is 
available up to 1991.
13 The data on corruption is from the original source (for consistency we 
use annual data up to 1991 where available). Figure 3 shows an inverse correlation between 
the share of state owned activity in GDP and the corruption index – higher participation by 
the state in economic activity is associated with a lower corruption index (a higher corruption 
level). Figure 4 shows the relationship between privatisation and inequality. As the share of 
SOEs in economic activity falls, inequality rises. Since one reason for a falling share of SOEs 
in economic activity is privatisation, it is reasonable to conclude that privatisation is 
positively associated with inequality. 
Given this rationale, the inclusion of a privatisation variable in the empirical model 
should lessen the impact of the corruption variable. The coefficient on priv is correctly signed 
and significant in both columns (2) and (4) in Table 3, while corupt is statistically 
insignificant. Once we control for privatisation, the importance of corruption in explaining 
inequality is reduced. This finding indicates that privatisation has had a regressive impact on 
the income distribution and is consistent with the assertions of Berry (1998) and Bulmer-
  12Thomas (1996). However, this does not mean that privatisation is necessarily a problem. The 
policy of ISI exacerbated inequality so that by the late 1970s the region had the most unequal 
income distribution in the world. Given this, it would require a huge effort over a lengthy 
period to overcome inequality.  
The privatisation process in many Latin American countries did not gain momentum 
until the 1990s. The move from a regulated to a non-regulated environment has been a 
learning experience and adjustment costs were inevitable. In fact, in the early years of the 
reform process little was known about the privatisation process both at the academic and 
managerial levels. The implication was/is that authorities must improvise and learn on the job. 
Generally, privatisation failures can be traced to substantial state participation in less than 
transparent processes, poor contract design, inadequate re-regulation, insufficient de-
regulation, deficient corporate governance institutions, and a lack of competition (Chong and 
López-de-Silanes, 2003). It was especially important to define a clear regulatory framework 
before firms are put up for sale. Unfortunately, in many countries it was difficult to do this 
because of the limited experience with the implementation of modern regulatory legislation 
and the absence of skilled personnel to carry out such an undertaking. In this situation, the 
input of international institutions is important and essential. The World Bank, for example, 
has taken an active stance on this issue by providing financial and technical support to 
countries engaged in the design of new regulations. In addition to skilled personnel and 
legislation, regulatory institutions need to maintain a certain degree of independence and not 
operate as mere agents of government.  
Even when authorities are convinced of the benefits of a well-designed regulatory 
framework, new legislation is likely to become operational slowly. Chong and López-de-
Silanes (2003, p. 41) note that “…..perfection in developing the regulatory framework may 
require a lot of time and this should not be used as an excuse for postponing the privatisation 
  13of money losing entities.” A natural implication of this is the need for sound institutions and 
good governance. It takes time to build institutions that are credible and able to fulfil their 
role. The problem is exacerbated in regions like Latin America which has a history of coerced 
labour and one in which institutions played an important role in protecting the interests of the 
elite. Moreover, it must be noted that privatisation and the reduction of corrupt practices 
cannot be seen as isolated ventures but rather as part of an overall programme of reform. 
If privatisation is properly undertaken as part of a wider programme of reform, it can 
produce efficiency gains, higher growth and an expansion in jobs. In addition, given that 
reform encourages competition, private firms will work towards enhancing efficiency, the 
gains of which can be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices
14 and increased 
access. It has been argued that privatisation also results in infrastructure developments 
(McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2005) and has a dynamism of its own, which in turn serves to 
create a demand for better institutions so as to achieve increased transparency, better 
regulation and more protection for minority holders (Boubakri et al, 2005). There are also 
fiscal gains as privatisation impacts on the government budget by reducing subsidies to 
previously state-owned enterprises, obtaining revenue from their sales
15 and higher taxes. 
Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003) argue that the gains from a well managed privatisation 
programme could be substantial not only for the privatised firm but for the society in general, 
while Kikeri and Nellis (2004) argues that privatisation should neither be abandoned nor 
reversed.  
Turning to other results in Table 3, there is no support for the Kuznets hypothesis as 
the coefficients are statistically insignificant and have incorrect signs. This finding is in line 
with the findings of others, including Ravallion (1995); Deininger and Squire (1988), 
Odekokun and Round (2004), and Angeles (2007). Indeed, Fields and Jakubson (1994) show 
  14that the estimated curve can go from an inverted U to U shaped when allowing for fixed 
effects. 
The coefficients on primary reflect the widely accepted view that a rise in education 
serves to reduce income inequality (see for instance, Tinbergen, 1975; Sylwester, 2002; Chu, 
2000). The positive coefficients on secondary suggest that a higher level of education 
increases skill differentials and worsens inequality. This finding is a reflection of the fact that 
education above the primary school level remains largely a privilege for the more wealthy. A 
natural solution is the introduction of an education strategy which achieves a significant leap 
in both participation rates and quality across the school system, and in particular at the 
secondary school level.  
The result for the agriculture variable is not surprising as one would expect that 
growth in the labour intensive sector would contribute to higher levels of employment among 
lower income households and falling inequality (Franko, 2003). The variable m2gdp is an 
indicator of financial development; however, it can also be interpreted as a proxy for financial 
reform or an indicator of macroeconomic policy. The coefficient is statistically significant and 
positive, which means that as the financial sector develops inequality rises. Similar results 
were found by Morley (2000), who noted that while the positive sign does not concur with the 
theory, it does support the assertion that inequality in the region widened after the 
implementation of reforms (Berry, 1998; Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). In line with the findings of 
Odekokun and Round (2004) and Angeles (2007), our results suggest that the concentration of 
land resources exacerbates the income inequality problem in the region. Similar conclusions 
were made by De Ferranti et al. (2004), who state that the unequal distribution of land matters 
as a source of inequality in Latin America and suggest that there is scope for land reform. If, 
however, land reform is to be successful at alleviating poverty and reducing inequality it must 
be part of a package which embraces complementary agricultural policies. 
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4. Robustness tests 
The results in columns (1)-(4) of Table 3 indicate consistency across OLS and IV 
estimation. However, it is important to carry out other checks for robustness, which is done in 
this section. Tables 4-6 report the results for different measures of privatisation, a different 
model specification, and a transformation of the dependent variable, respectively. 
Two alternative measures of privatisation are used - a privatisation index taken from 
Morley (1999) and a dummy variable, which assumes a value of 1 in the starting year of 
significant privatisation activity and continuing thereafter, zero otherwise. The results are 
presented in Table 4. The privatisation coefficient is statistically significant and the inclusion 
of privatisation renders the corruption variable insignificant (as before). There are no 
significant changes with respect to the other variables. The signs on the income and income 
squared variables are consistent with the Kuznets’ hypothesis (Model 2) but the coefficients 
are statistically insignificant. 
A change to the model specification is made by introducing two new independent 
variables - the trade ratio (export + imports/GDP) as a measure of the openness of the 
economy (open) and domestic credit to the private sector (dcps) as an alternative measure of 
financial development. Research has shown that greater trade openness leads to higher 
inequality (see Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007 for a review of the channels through which 
openness affects inequality). There is much debate on the best way to capture openness (see 
Spilimbergo et al, 1999) and we opt for the trade ratio due to data availability. The results are 
presented in Table 5 and are similar to before. The sign on open is as expected and the sign on 
the credit variable is consistent with that on m2gdp in Tables 3 and 4. Other explanatory 
variables were included in the model as were various interaction terms (not reported) but 
these proved to be insignificant.   
  16As the Gini coefficient is bounded between 0 and 100, OLS may be problematic since 
it assumes that the dependent variable is unbounded. In order to overcome this potential 
problem, the dependent variable is transformed using the formula log[gini/(100-gini)] to 
become unbounded. The results in Table 6 reveal no marked difference to our earlier results. 




This paper has examined income inequality in Latin America with particular reference 
given to the relationship between inequality, corruption and privatisation. In contrast to 
previous empirical work, falling levels of corruption in Latin America are associated with 
higher levels of inequality. A lower level of corruption per se does not worsen inequality. 
Rather it is a development strategy focused around privatisation that serves as the conduit for 
the impact of corruption. With privatisation, industries are removed from direct state control 
and associated corrupt practices. However, as private investors focus on efficiency and 
profitability, firms are restructured and inequality worsens.  
The paper has argued that inequality is the outcome of historical legacies and has 
persisted over time because little or nothing has been done to increase or enhance the assets of 
those affected. To reduce inequality policies need to target directly the distribution of income. 
In other words, structural reform programmes which enhance growth must be accompanied 
by policies that promote human and physical capital development so that the productivity of 
the poorest groups can be increased. Suitable measures include the effective use of taxes and 
transfers to augment incomes and provide the opportunity for asset accumulation by those in 
the lowest income groups; direct investment in education (better trained teachers and 
  17  18
complementary schooling resources); and investment in physical infrastructure, especially in 
rural areas.   
The income distribution problem cannot be dismissed as a temporary and inevitable 
cost as economies strive towards positive and increasing economic growth. Rather, 
governments must design and implement privatisation (and reform) programmes that can 
achieve gains both in terms of distribution and efficiency (growth). The initial regressive 
impact of the reforms highlights the fact that relying primarily on markets to reduce inequality 
is insufficient and must be complemented with state intervention. In other words, Latin 
America requires “good governance” from the state sector.  References History Growth, Distribution and  
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  25Table 1: Inequality in Latin America (average Gini coefficient) 
Country  1981-84 1985-88 1989-92 1993-96  1996-2000 
Argentina  40.98 41.55 45.60 45.83  47.90 
Bolivia    51.50 53.50 51.41  60.10 
Brazil  57.23 58.75 61.83 59.03  60.30 
Chile  54.53 55.11 55.65 53.00  56.50 
Columbia 55.75    55.05  58.29  57.40 
Costa Rica  46.90    48.13  48.15  48.68 
Dominican  Republic    45.20 51.50 51.60  48.90 
Ecuador   44.40  56.07  56.97 
Guatemala   56.00  55.30    54.90 
Honduras    54.80 55.33 55.05  53.90 
Jamaica     54.45  59.40  56.75 
Mexico    50.60 53.10 54.55  54.90 
Nicaragua       53.90  54.30 
Panama 47.60    57.75  56.80  57.20 
Peru     50.90  54.70  50.12 
Paraguay 45.10    39.80  55.85  55.40 
El Salvador      47.10  50.15  53.60 
Uruguay  42.10 40.13 41.14 43.17  43.79 
Venezuela  45.40 46.23 44.29 44.01  47.91 
        
Latin America (19)  48.40  49.48  51.20  52.83  53.66 
Source: UNU-WIDER (2005) 
  26Table 2: Corruption in Latin America  
Country  1981-84 1985-88 1989-92 1993-96  1996-2000 
Argentina 4  4  4  3.25  2.5 
Bolivia  1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
Brazil  4  4  4 3.5 3 
Bolivia  1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
Chile  3 3 3 3 4 
Colombia 3  3  3  3  1.75 
Costa  Rica  5 5 5 5 5 
Dominican  Republic 3 3 3 3 4 
Ecuador 3  3  3  3  3.25 
Guatemala  2 2 2 2 4 
Honduras  2 2 2 2 2 
Jamaica  2  2  2 2.75 3 
Mexico 3  3  3  3  2.5 
Nicaragua  3 5 5 5 4 
Panama  2 2 2 2 2 
Peru  3 3 3 3 3 
Paraguay 1  0.25  1.5  2.25  2 
El  Salvador  2  2 2.25 3 3.75 
Uruguay  3 3 3 3 3 
Venezuela  3 3 3 3 3 
       
Latin America (19)  2.74  2.83  2.93  3.01  3.09 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); Published by the PRS Group (2003) 
Corruption index is from 0 (high) to 6 (low) 
  27Table 3: Estimation results  
Dependent variable: Gini index  (1) OLS  (2) OLS^  (3) IV  (4) IV^ 
        
lgdp    -46.7849  -28.0325  -21.0859  -28.1419 
 [0.4253]  [0.2563]  [0.2091]  [0.2924] 
lgdp
2  22.2923 13.2250  8.8934  15.1327 
 [0.4053]  [0.2420]  [0.1767]  [0.3156] 
primary -0.1044**  -0.0980**  -0.1238**  -0.1440*** 
 [2.3227]  [2.2225]  [2.4235]  [3.9941] 
secondary 0.0788**  0.0535*  0.1099**  0.0366** 
 [2.3072]  [1.8103]  [2.5766]  [1.9700] 
aggdp -0.4844***  -0.4261***  -0.4261***  -0.5385*** 
 [4.4663]  [3.7990]  [4.3792]  [4.8526] 
m2gdp   0.1050***  0.0892**  0.1172***  0.1200*** 
 [2.6283]  [2.2503]  [3.1632]  [2.9350] 
land 30.1783*  32.8518**  29.6487*  31.5868* 
 [1.7924]  [1.9872]  [1.75411]  [1.8670] 
corupt 0.9375*  0.4932  1.8081**  0.2043 
 [1.8391]  [1.1071]  [2.2437]  [0.6477] 
priv     0.3750**    0.3607** 
   [2.1090]    [1.9950] 
Constant 53.5781**  46.1158*  60.0527***  80.7542*** 
 [2.1978]  [1.9027]  [2.7677]  [3.7006] 
        
F- test  33.3657  34.1032     
(p-value) (0.000)  [0.000]     
Hausman test  15.8026  17.588     
(p-value)   (0.0453)  (0.0403)     
F-1st F-statistic       12.512***  22.479*** 
Test for overidentifiying  
restrictions 
   0.010  0.021 
Adjusted R
2  0.85 0.90  0.85  0.89 
Number of Observations  70  72  70  72 
Robust t ratios in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
^ priv = cumulative % of GDP 
Fixed effects not reported
  28Table 4: Estimation results - alternative measures of privatisation 
Dependent variable: Gini index  (1) OLS^  (2) OLS+  (3) IV^  (4) IV+ 
        
lgdp    -53.6396  34.4702  -54.1105  -12.2076 
 [0.4780]  [0.1779]  [0.4693]  [0.1018] 
lgdp
2  25.6610 -15.6440  28.9350  5.0762 
 [0.4591]  [0.1632]  [0.4503]  [0.0849] 
primary -0.1017**  -0.1041**  -0.1057**  -0.1299*** 
 [2.2612]  [1.9987]  [2.1462]  [3.3055] 
secondary 0.0683*  0.0629*  0.07115*  0.0610* 
 [1.8567]  [1.7801]  [1.8169]  [1.7520] 
aggdp -0.3923***  -0.6306***  -0.3561***  0.5740*** 
 [3.6735]  [3.3062]  [3.5332]  [5.0203] 
m2gdp   0.0798**  0.1366***  0.0860**  0.11678** 
 [2.0879]  [4.1745]  [2.2361]  [2.4612] 
land 35.8260**  -56.7600*  36.1692**  27.1462* 
 [2.4305]  [1.7709]  [2.5841]  [1.7366] 
corupt 0.5665  0.6746  0.4305  0.4272 
 [1.0456]  [1.1816]  [0.6077]  [0.7252] 
priv   1.5875**  -3.2245***  1.5305**  6.9971** 
 [2.0696]  [3.6625]  [2.3216]  [2.0136] 
Constant 50.7565**  79.2240*  47.1309**  98.4790*** 
 [2.3522]  [1.9080]  [2.0636]  [2.9743] 
        
F- test  23.4264  25.0750     
(p-value) (0.000)  [0.000]     
Hausman test  20.1731  20.9634     
(p-value)   (0.0136)  (0.0128)     
F-1st F-statistic       11.625***  27.625 
Test for overidentifiying 
restrictions 
   0.111  0.119 
Adjusted R
2  0.86 0.88  0.86  0.87 
Number of Observations  70  68  70  68 
Robust t ratios in brackets.          
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
^ priv = index 
+ priv = dummy 
Fixed effects not reported
  29Table 5: Estimation results - alternative model specification 
Dependent variable: Gini index  (1) OLS  (2) OLS^  (3) IV  (4) IV^ 
        
lgdp    -46.7849  -53.6396  34.8602  13.4814 
 [0.4253]  [0.4780]  [0.3275]  [0.1148] 
lgdp
2  22.2923 25.6610  -18.6644  -7.6890 
 [0.4053]  [0.4591]  [0.3502]  [0.1309] 
primary -0.1044**  -0.1017**  -0.0865**  -0.0901** 
 [2.3227]  [2.2612]  [1.9884]  [1.9898] 
secondary 0.0788**  0.0683*  0.1215***  0.1049*** 
 [2.3072]  [1.8567]  [2.949]  [2.5597] 
open -0.0564***  -0.0623***  -0.0578***  -0.46662** 
 [2.7949]  [3.5390]  [2.6840]  2.0474 
dcps   0.1050***  0.0798**  0.0687***  0.0807*** 
 [2.6283]  [2.0879]  [3.5427]  [3.1924] 
land 30.1783*  35.8260**  32.4934*  26.3494* 
 [1.7924]  [2.4305]  [1.8177]  [1.9387] 
corupt 0.9375*  0.2740  1.3337**  0.3407 
 [1.8391]  [0.6221]  [2.2205]  [0.6889 
priv     0.4480**    0.4638** 
   [2.535]    [2.4676] 
constant 53.5781**  50.7565**  44.5458*  50.3972** 
 [2.1978]  [2.3522]  [2.0950]  [2.3755] 
        
F- test  33.3657  23.4264     
(p-value) (0.000)  (0.000)     
Hausman test  15.8026  20.1731     
(p-value)   (0.0253)  (0.000)     
F-1st F-statistic       22.1210***  29.3528*** 
Test for overidentifiying 
restrictions 
   0.202  0.210 
Adjusted R
2  0.85 0.86  0.88  0.86 
Number of Observations  74  74  72  72 
Robust t ratios in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
^ priv = cumulative % 
Fixed effects not reported
  30Table 6: Estimation results - Gini index unbounded 
Dependent variable: Gini index  (1) OLS  (2) OLS^  (3) IV  (4) IV^ 
        
lgdp    -1.7183  -2.0736  -1.2736  -2.2106 
 [0.3864]  [0.4590]  [0.2871]  [0.5264] 
lgdp
2  0.8149 0.9904  0.5759  1.0639 
 [0.3665]  [0.4383]  [0.26024]  [0.5072] 
primary -0.0042**  -0.0041**  -0.0047**  -0.0044** 
 [2.2954]  [2.2449]  [2.2330]  [2.2046] 
secondary 0.0032**  0.0023  0.0042**  0.0029* 
 [2.3079]  [1.5548]  [2.3889]  [1.7022] 
aggdp -0.0196***  -0.0158***  -0.0173***  -0.0144*** 
 [4.4739]  [3.6750]  [4.4209]  [3.474] 
m2gdp   0.0042***  0.0032**  0.0047***  0.0033** 
 [2.6316]  [2.0895]  [3.0697]  [2.0907] 
land 1.2106***  1.4450**  1.11894  1.4549** 
 [1.  7787]  [2.5717]  [1.7462]  [2.5717] 
corupt 0.0381*  0.0231  0.0677**  0.0442 
 [1.8847]  [1.0456]  [2.2304]  [1.2180] 
priv     0.0648**    0.0601** 
   [2.3657]    [2.145] 
constant 0.1422  0.1409  0.3228  -0.1408 
 [0.9842]  [0.1533]  [0.3606]  [0.1539] 
        
F- test  32.9122  24.1352     
(p-value) (0.000)  (0.000)     
Hausman test  15.7787  21.0262     
(p-value)   (0.0457)  (0.000)     
F-1st F-statistic       13.623***  16.527 
Test for overidentifiying 
restrictions 
   3.248  1.623 
Adjusted R
2  0.93 0.94  0.92  0.92 
Number of Observations  70  70  70  70 
Robust t ratios in square brackets.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
^ priv = cumulative %  
Fixed effects not reported 
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1 Corruption might be influenced by the perception of corruption. In some cases, corruption 
perceptions might reinforce or diminish corruption (see, Cabelková, 2001). 
2 They were generous for universities and other higher learning institutions which were 
geared towards providing education to the children of the elite. 
3 Several other reasons are cited in De Ferranti et al. (2004, Chapter 4) for the neglect of 
education in the 20
th century. 
4 Leamer (1984) and Bowen et al (1987) show that the abundant factor in most countries of 
the region is not labour but some natural resource; furthermore, labour skills in the region are 
ranked at an intermediate level on a world scale. 
5 Lewis (1954) provided a similar basis for rising inequality in his labour surplus model. 
6 Countries included in the sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
7 Available on http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. 
8 Jong-Sung & Khagram (2005) provide a discussion of the channels through which 
inequality affects corruption. 
9 Source: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.  
10 Source: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx. The index range in values from 0 to 6, 
with a  higher value indicating a “better” rating. 
11 In general, the protection of domestic industries from international competition creates the 
potential for lucrative rents, which entrepreneurs are willing to pay for in the form of bribes 
(Mauro, 1997).  
12 This is so for several reasons: lower income workers are more likely to be laid off than the 
higher income ones; dismissed low income workers have more difficulty finding   37
                                                                                                                               
employment; if they do obtain alternative employment it may be less remunerative; and if 
both unskilled and skilled labour have been laid off, there is a greater chance that alternative 
employment will be obtained by skilled individuals. 
13 Because of the short time span for this variable it is not used in the econometric estimation. 
14 It has been suggested that poor householders do not mind a reasonable price increase if it is 
associated with an improvement in the quality of the service. There are examples where, prior 
to privatisation, poor householders have an illegal connection to water but the quality is 
compromised; with privatisation there is a rise in cost though water quality is not 
compromised. In some instances households even end up paying less with privatisation 
(Estache et al, 2001) because of increased competition. 
15 Based on their own calculations, La Porta & López -de-Silanes (1997) conclude that the 
additional revenues received by the government in Mexico as a result of privatisation was 
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